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Mentioned that some pages back. Very normal to check for duplicates in software systems; so if there was any suspicion of problems then checking for identical transactions that happen in a short space of time would be both an obvious and fairly easy thing to do.
So easy to eliminate the Horizon system and I assume a manual stocktake/audit would eliminate that, but there’s still a cash shortfall so how far up the ladder do you go?.
Who got the backhanders
 
So easy to eliminate the Horizon system and I assume a manual stocktake/audit would eliminate that, but there’s still a cash shortfall so how far up the ladder do you go?.
Who got the backhanders
Not sure; I was just mentioning that it's a relatively easy thing in software to do something on the lines if "if transactionX is identical to transactionX-1 and the time difference between them is short". What's harder is spotting patterns of behaviour (the sort of thing that humans are better at visualising).
 
Not sure; I was just mentioning that it's a relatively easy thing in software to do something on the lines if "if transactionX is identical to transactionX-1 and the time difference between them is short". What's harder is spotting patterns of behaviour (the sort of thing that humans are better at visualising).
Watched some of the inquiry when Fujitsu software engineer was testifying I’m sure they had designed a macro to eliminate dual entries in the ARQ data requested by PO.Could be wrong I’m no software engineer.
 
The roll-out of the Horizon system was one of the biggest networked IT projects of its day. Having watched the testimony of some of the Fujitsu team involved in maintaining it, and the processes involved in logging and addressing faults, I'm severely unimpressed with both the apparent quality of the people and the integrity of the fault-logging and bug-fixing procedures.

The inquiry can be watched online. The testimonies on Wednesday and Thursday this week are shocking.

Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
 
....

The failure to investigate, simply prosecute, is characteristic of plain incompetence, denial or malicious intent.
Or raving rampant ambition by a domineering personality, probably Vennels, but not unassisted. I think a lot of them are shocked to see how much they've been led down the garden path, coming out as venal as Vennels. They could have been heroic whistle-blowers instead!
 
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Watched some of the inquiry when Fujitsu software engineer was testifying I’m sure they had designed a macro to eliminate dual entries in the ARQ data requested by PO.Could be wrong I’m no software engineer.
Makes sense. But does that mean "Fujitsu removed data that looked bad before handing it over the PO, when the PO were investigating problems?"
 
Makes sense. But does that mean "Fujitsu removed data that looked bad before handing it over the PO, when the PO were investigating problems?"
Yes, as I understand it the PO asked them to remove any duplicate transactions as they might be spotted by the defence at court and could potentially undermine the integrity of Horizon software.
 
Fujitsu noticed anomalies in the data retrieval and didn't initially disclose the issue to PO.
They also filtered the raw data to make it more manageable to retrieve but didn't make that clear to Fujitsu people signing witness statements, or the PO who seemed to implicitly believe the system and data was fine. The tech guy retrieving data didn't appreciate the legal implications.

The investigators didn't understand their legal responsibilities to provide the defence with evidence even if it undermined their prosecution.

Complete clusterfudge from end to end.
 
The roll-out of the Horizon system was one of the biggest networked IT projects of its day. Having watched the testimony of some of the Fujitsu team involved in maintaining it, and the processes involved in logging and addressing faults, I'm severely unimpressed with both the apparent quality of the people and the integrity of the fault-logging and bug-fixing procedures.

The inquiry can be watched online. The testimonies on Wednesday and Thursday this week are shocking.

Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
I'm probably a bit more lenient about the tech support 'experts'

They had a log of incidents and known faults. The level 1 and 2 support teams didn't seem to use the known faults info sensibly. Telling people they were the only ones who have reported certain faults is hard to understand because they were recorded.

What strikes me is the usual reliance on a few key people. Techies who make themselves indispensable and love being the go to person. Often not sharing knowledge with their less able colleagues. Easier to do it yourself.
That doesn't make them bad people. Management allows it to happen and people don't understand enough about the whole end to end process and the impact on the end user.
 
Here's an interesting youtube video by Andrew Bridgen MP, an early advocate for the sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses.

In 2014 he approached ITV with the story but got nowhere with it. In 2014 the chief executive of ITV was Adam Crozier, who also happened to be the chief executive of Royal Mail Group from 2003-2010, when the Post Office was still part of the Royal Mail Group, and when the majority of the miscarriages of justice were happening.

Bridgen played a big part in bringing the scandal to light in the House of Commons; at first he seems to be singing his own praises a bit, but then you see that that's because his considerable part in the story is unacknowledged in the ITV drama. At Adam Crozier's intervention?

Food for thought....

Youtube: Andrew Bridgen MP on the Post Office scandal
 
Andrew Bridgen doing something good for the world? Whatever next.

I suppose even a blind squirrel occasionally finds a nut.
 
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