SSRN Author: Marcus PivatoMarcus Pivato SSRN Content
https://privwww.ssrn.com/author=2357641
https://privwww.ssrn.com/rss/en-usTue, 03 Aug 2021 01:21:09 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Tue, 03 Aug 2021 01:21:09 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: Weighted Representative DemocracyWe propose a new system of democratic representation. Any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. We show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then with very high probability, the decisions obtained in the legislature agree with those which would have been reached by a popular referendum decided by simple majority vote.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3468210
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2047059.htmlMon, 02 Aug 2021 15:12:07 GMTREVISION: Rank-Additive Population EthicsThe class of "rank-additive" (RA) axiologies includes rank-weighted utilitarian, generalized utilitarian, and rank-discounted generalized utilitarian rules; it is a flexible framework for population ethics. This paper axiomatically characterizes RA axiologies and studies their properties in two frameworks: the "actualist" framework (which only tracks the utilities of people who actually exist), and the "possibilist" framework (which also assigns zero utilities to people who don’t exist). The axiomatizations and properties are quite different in the two frameworks. For example, actualist RA axiologies can simultaneously evade the Repugnant Conclusion and promote equality, whereas in the possibilist framework, there is a tradeoff between these two desiderata. On the other hand, possibilist RA axiologies satisfy the Positive Expansion and Negative Expansion axioms, whereas the actualist ones don’t.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3231904
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2047058.htmlMon, 02 Aug 2021 15:11:38 GMTREVISION: Bayesian Social Aggregation with Accumulating EvidenceHow should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under these updates. I show that this “asymptotic” Pareto principle implies that the social planner must be a utilitarian. But it does not impose any relationship between the beliefs of the individuals and those of the planner, except for a weak compatibility condition.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3677336
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2031236.htmlMon, 07 Jun 2021 10:14:49 GMTREVISION: Deliberation and Epistemic DemocracyWe study the effects of deliberation on epistemic social choice, in two settings. In the first setting, the group faces a binary epistemic decision analogous to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In the second setting, group members have probabilistic beliefs arising from their private information, and the group wants to aggregate these beliefs in a way that makes optimal use of this information. During deliberation, each agent discloses private information to persuade the other agents of her current views. But her views may also evolve over time, as she learns from other agents. This process will improve the performance of the group, but only under certain conditions; these involve the nature of the social decision rule, the group size, and also the presence of “neutral agents” whom the other agents try to persuade.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3440612
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1994329.htmlTue, 23 Feb 2021 11:45:47 GMTREVISION: Bayesian Social Aggregation with Accumulating EvidenceHow should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under these updates. I show that this “asymptotic” Pareto principle implies that the social planner must be a utilitarian. But it does not impose any relationship between the beliefs of the individuals and those of the planner.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3677336
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1964158.htmlSat, 21 Nov 2020 09:46:16 GMTREVISION: A Characterization of Cesàro Average UtilityLet X be a connected metric space, let N be the set of natural numbers, and let > be a preference order defined on a suitable subset of X^N. I characterize when > has a Cesàro average utility representation. This means that there is a continuous function u from X into the real numbers, such that one sequence in X^N is preferred to another sequence if it yields a higher limit, as n goes to infinity, of the average utility over the first n terms in the sequence. This has applications to decision theory and inter-generational social choice.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3677206
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1963932.htmlFri, 20 Nov 2020 10:46:45 GMTREVISION: Bayesian Social Aggregation with Accumulating EvidenceHow should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under these updates. I show that this “asymptotic” Pareto principle implies that the social planner must be a utilitarian. But it does not impose any relationship between the beliefs of the individuals and those of the planner.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3677336
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1948811.htmlWed, 07 Oct 2020 18:09:03 GMTREVISION: A Characterization of Cesàro Average UtilityLet X be a connected metric space, let N be the set of natural numbers, and let > be a preference order defined on a suitable subset of X^N. I characterize when > has a Cesàro average utility representation. This means that there is a continuous function u from X into the real numbers, such that one sequence in X^N is preferred to another sequence if it yields a higher limit, as n goes to infinity, of the average utility over the first n terms in the sequence. This has applications to decision theory and inter-generational social choice.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3677206
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1948776.htmlWed, 07 Oct 2020 17:16:20 GMT